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| Extremely cold weather and wooded, hilly terrain hampered operations in the Ardennes during the Battle of the Bulge |
Chapter 7
With the German attack through the Ardennes in its seventh day, the enemy's intentions and order of battle began to crystallize. St. Vith had fallen, Stavelot and Bastogne on either shoulder of the breakthrough were still in American hands. Units of three panzer corps, including four SS panzer divisions and four others, had been identified in the 35 mile penetration. The German High Command had mustered some of its very best troops for this bid to cut the supply lines behind the American and British forces on the northern half of the Western Front. It was an all-out effort, and the battle was bound to be hard fought.
During its second day in the new area, our Corps formed a defensive line by establishing road blocks and outposts east and west of Marche. Corps troops played an integral part in this defense, with our engineers, cavalry, artillery, antiaircraft artillery, tank destroyers, tanks, and even service troops manning defenses behind our front line divisions in event of an enemy infiltration or breakthrough. Numerous small enemy armored thrusts from the southeast and southwest were either repulsed or destroyed. The 3d Armored Division was attached, and the VII Corps line-up to stop the offensive drive was, from east to west: 3d Armored, 84th Infantry, and 2d Armored divisions, with the 75th Infantry Division in reserve.
The enemy continued to build up his forces in the Marche-Hotton area with the apparent intention of launching a new drive for the Meuse River, and his reconnaissance and probing of our line resulted in numerous pitched battles with small groups of infantry and tanks.
The day before Christmas, the Corps received instructions releasing it from all offensive missions and giving it the job of stabilizing the right flank of the first U.S. Army sector. While these instructions released us from the responsibility of carrying the offensive to the enemy and stressed our defense of the area, they did not prohibit us from attacking, and the Corps Commander directed an active defense, including several limited objective attacks to improve our positions. We would stop the enemy drive where it was, east and south of the Meuse.
Both friendly and enemy lines were fluid during the early days of the fighting, and several of our units were temporarily cut off by the German columns. Task Forces Hogan and Richardson of the 3d Armored Division were isolated in two different spots. Richardson attempted to fight his way back, but every route was blocked. Hogan carried the fight far in advance of other elements of his division and had too little gasoline and ammunition to return. In the little town of Marcouray he set up his defense and waited for reinforcements of supplies. Attempts were made to drop gasoline and ammunition to his force by plane, but none were successful. Eventually, both forces disabled their equipment to prevent it from being used by the Germans and made their way back to our lines on foot. The 3d Battalion, 335t Infantry was out posting the area south and west of Rochefort when it was cut off by advancing enemy tanks. Finding all roads north to their division sector blocked, they withdrew by circuitous routes, moving west of the Meuse, then north, rejoining their regiment several days later.
Several more German tank attacks were repulsed on Christmas Day, and heavy losses were inflicted on the enemy, both in prisoners captured and in tanks and equipment destroyed. An Attack of the 2d Panzer Division south of Ciney was checked by the 2d Armored Division, and in the ensuing three-day battle, the German tank outfit was badly mauled by our armor.
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| Extremely cold weather and wooded, hilly terrain hampered operations in the Ardennes during the Battle of the Bulge |
Although visibility in our area continued to be poor and close air support of our units was not practicable, planes of the Allied Air Forces flew thousands of sorties over the battle areas farther east and claimed an impressive total of tanks and motorized equipment knocked out. In the five days when operations were possible in the latter part of December, air attacks scored 210 tanks and armored vehicles destroyed and 80 more damaged, and 820 motor vehicles destroyed with 250 more damaged. Such losses as these are bound to have had an adverse effect on the enemy's ability to carry on the battle.
Our line continued firm and was strengthened all along the front as our attacks pushed the enemy from his newest gains and repulsed all his attempts to work farther to the north. The 83d Infantry Division rejoined the Corps and assembled in Corps reserve. Our contact with the XVIII Airborne Corps and the British XXX Corps on either flank was strong, and by December 28th the punch of von Rundstedt's drive was gone. Thereafter, contacts became lighter as German elements generally assumed the defensive or withdrew under the constant pressure of our attacks. Another mission had been accomplished by our Corps. The right flank of the Army was stabilized - the Ardennes counteroffensive had been stopped.
The German drive had been stopped and now it must be thrown in reverse, so on 3 January 1945, First Army launched its attack to wipe out the bulge in its lines that had been caused by the initial German successes. VII Corps side-slipped its divisions to the east, then attacked southeast in the Army's main effort to cut off or drive back the enemy forces remaining in the bulge. The 2d and 3d Armored Divisions led the attack, closely followed by the infantry of the 84th and 83d Divisions, while the 75th held its defensive line. The weather was bitterly cold, snow and ice made the roads slippery and hampered the movement of our tanks, but the attack made slow, steady progress. Resistance was stubborn, terrain favored the defenders, snow and poor visibility interfered with tank and artillery firing, but still the armor pushed on, driving some of the best troops in the Wehrmacht back, or bypassing pockets of resistance for the supporting infantry to mop up. There were the usual enemy counterattacks, but none proved profitable, and the Germans went back to the defensive, trying to hold back the relentless pressure of our men and armor.
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Hauffalize, Belgium, after Americans retook it in the Ardennes fighting. |
By the 9th it was indicated that the German commander was gradually displacing his divisions to the east, withdrawing his best troops first, leaving his second and third rate units to delay our advance. Resistance on the west had considerably lessened, but on the east every kilometer was bitterly contested. Gradually our infantry divisions worked past our armor, giving the tank men a chance to rest and repair their equipment. Enemy pressure continued to be heavy, and the delaying forces withdrew only when their positions became untenable. Our successes were due to the continuous American offensive pressure and certainly not to any decline in the German defense. With minefields, road blocks, dug-in tanks and guns, he executed the maximum possible delay to our advance.
The winter weather, snow, and ground haze practically eliminated air support from this phase of the operation. Twice the skies cleared enough to let fighter-bombers attack, but for the remainder of the offensive the ground troops fought it out without aerial help.
Gradually the gap between the Third and First U.S. Armies narrowed. Third Army units relieved the beleaguered 101st Airborne Division in Bastogne after their gallant defense of that city and continued the drive north toward Houffalize. Every day more of the area north of the Ourthe River was cleared by the attacks of the VII and XVIII Corps. To our west, British units were driving eastward, maintaining contact with both First and Third Army elements. Finally VII and VIII Corps linked forces at Hoffalize and along the Ourthe on January 16th, pinching the British units out of contact. The bulge was only a bump, and that was fast disappearing.
By January 19th the enemy forces were definitely attempting to withdraw, leaving the usual delaying forces to cover the extrication of their best troops and equipment. Most of the VII Corps front was pinched out by continued advances of the VIII Corps of the south and the XVIII Airborne Corps on the north, until only the 84th Division remained in the battle. As Corps units were relieved, they assembled to refurbish their equipment and to shelter and rest their men. On the 24th, Major General Alexander R. Bolling's 84th Division reached its objectives, completed it mission of mopping up the remaining Corps front, and was attached to XVIII Corps.
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| Big guns like the 8" howitzer helped pound the enemy out of the Bulge. |
For a brief period (January 21 - 23) the weather cleared enough for fighter-bombers to operate on armed reconnaissance in the area east of the First Army front, and the havoc they caused among the withdrawing enemy columns reminded us of the days of the Normandy breakthrough and the Falaise-Argentan gap. For three days our planes dived on the crowded roads, and the tally showed 71 tanks and armored vehicles destroyed, 94 damaged, over 1600 trucks and other motor vehicles in ruins, and another 1700 damaged. In the same period, attacks on German railroads east of the bulge netted over 850 railroad cars damaged or destroyed.
Now completely out of contact with the enemy, and even out of hearing of the guns, VII Corps assembled in the vicinity of Ochain, Belgium to rest its personnel and to service and repair its vehicles and equipment after the grueling winter battle. This was the first real rest the Corps Headquarters and some of its troops had had since D-Day, and every effort was made to house the personnel comfortably. For twelve days the troops enjoyed the comparative luxury of their Belgian billets, then on February 5th VII Corps returned to Germany, to the same sector it had left before the Battle of the Bulge.
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The Battle of the Bulge |