Chapter 9

While VII Corps was clearing its zone along the west bank of the Rhine, troops of the III Corps streamed across the bridge at Remagen and pushed on to establish a bridgehead over the river. Although harassed continually by fire from German 88's on the hills overlooking the crossing and by suicidal dive-bombing attacks of the German Air Force, traffic continued to flow across the fateful bridge. At sites that were often under enemy fire, engineers quickly built additional floating bridges to carry more troops and supplies into the bitterly contested bridgehead, and gradually the Americans' first slim toe hold east of the river became a foothold.

VII Corps once more came into the fray when elements of the 1st Division crossed the Rhine and assembled in First Army's week-old bridgehead. The 78th Infantry Division, already attacking to clear more territory north of the bridge sites, was attached to our Corps and continued its attack. Then on March 17th both divisions joined in a renewed attack to widen the foothold east of the river to permit construction of additional bridges. The terrain was rough, hilly and wooded, and well suited to the enemy's defense. In an attempt to contain our troops and limit their advanced east of the Rhine while he mustered forces to wipe out our bridgehead, the German commander had moved two divisions and parts of five others into the hills surrounding our forces. Pressure on our attacking units was heavy. Enemy artillery fires were particularly active as the defenders reacted violently to our advance in the eastern part of the sector. Critical terrain features were strongly defended by small arms, mortar, artillery, and self-propelled gun fire, and some tanks were encountered, supporting small groups of infantry in defensive or counterattacking roles. Enemy troops formed up repeatedly for counterattacks, but our artillery fires usually dispersed these threats before they could strike.

VII Corps Engineers build a pontoon treadway bridge across the Rhine.

VII Corps engineers completed their first bridge across the Rhine, a floating treadway 1,176 feet long, on the 17th, and as the attack cleared more and more of the east bank of the river, two more crossings were built.

Gains up to three kilometers a day were being made in the difficult, wooded terrain of the Sauerland. Numerous local counterattacks struck our infantry as they slowly pushed the enemy back, but all were mopped up quickly. By the 21st, Major General Edwin P. Parker, Jr.'s 78th Division had cleared its zone north to the Sieg river, which made a natural protective barrier for that flank, and was pushing on to the east along that stream. The daily gains of the 1st and 78th had provided additional room in the VII Corps sector of the bridgehead, and more Corps units moved across the Rhine to join the fight. The initial Army bridgehead line was reached on the 23d. VII Corps held a sector 15 kilometers deep, and its units re-grouped for the next attack, all the while continuing to exert pressure on the enemy. The 104th Division joined the eastward attack of the 1st, while the 78th protected the Corps left flank along the Sieg. Enemy delaying action gave way to bitter fighting, and counterattack after counterattack was repelled as successive waves of enemy forces were driven back.

An action shot of infantrymen crossing a river in assault boats.

Engineers direct operations like these. On March 25th First Army launched its attack to burst out of the bridgehead, with the VII, III, and V Corps all driving eastward. The 3d Armored Division passed through the 1st and 104th in four columns, closely followed by the supporting infantry, and despite difficult terrain, minefields, and enemy fire from small arms, self-propelled guns, and tanks, good progress was made. Using strong forces of tanks and infantry from reinforcements rushed into the threatened area, the enemy unsuccessfully attempted to stem our advance. Eight enemy divisions were identified on the VII Corps front, but in spite of the number of units, the quality of many of the troops was low.

In the first day's drive our armored columns advanced 20 kilometers. Resistance to the advance of the 104th Division on the south was moderate, but the 1st Division farther north fought off determined counterattacks as it moved east and also protected part of the Corps left flank. In another day the leading columns dashed 35 kilometers farther to seize all assigned objectives, and the Corps had contact with the enemy on a front along the west bank of the Rhine and the south bank of the Sieg for 97 miles.

Once more elements of the VII Corps had achieved a breakthrough, - now to exploit the situation. While our armored columns raced ahead, meeting only moderate resistance, our infantry cleared town after town, taking over a thousand prisoners a day. On the 28th the attack swung north-east and armored units sped another 35 kilometers to capture Marburg. The Corps advance had moved so fast, covering 90 kilometers in only three days, that this city of 25,000 population, famed as one of Germany's cultural centers, was virtually undamaged. Its 13th Century cathedral and its university founded in 1527 escaped completely the destruction that attended the capture of Aachen, Duren, Cologne, and Bonn. Several German military hospitals were overrun here, and thousands of soldier-patients became our prisoners. How little the Germans expected the arrival of our forces was shown when a railroad train loaded with civilians and convalescent soldiers being taken to Marburg for a rest and vacation was halted just outside the city by our tanks. But there was no rest or relaxation for our troops either, for now the Corps front extended approximately 200 kilometers, or 125 miles.

From Marburg the racing armor drove north. In a single day's record advance of 90 kilometers, several thousand more prisoners were taken, and our spearheads reached the area just south of Paderborn. This maneuver was of far-reaching importance to the allied cause, for by this action the enemy defending the Ruhr valley were practically cut off. VII corps forces now encircled them on the west, south and east along a 200 mile front.

To protect our long left flank against possible counterattacks in strength was a big task. The 78th Division extended its zone farther eastward along the Sieg and the 4th Cavalry Group and 8th Infantry Division moved in to relieve elements of the 1st Division still farther east, while the 86th Infantry Division took over the defense of the Rhine's west bank, a task from which VII Corps was soon relieved.

As the 3d Armored columns closed on Paderborn, they encountered increasing resistance from enemy strongpoints, roadblocks, and stubborn opposition in defended villages. While First Army was breaking out of its bridgehead, troops of the Ninth U.S. Army had crossed the Rhine north of the Ruhr and were now driving east toward Paderborn, paced by the tanks of the 2d Armored Division. A link-up of the two American armies in this area would be a crushing blow to Germany, for it would isolate one of the Reich's largest industrial areas and the thousands of troops defending it. And so thousands of SS troops, the elite of the Wehrmacht, were thrown into the battle as the enemy attempted to stabilize his defenses and to hold Paderborn's important road center, to keep his Ruhr escape route open.

On March 31st the United States Army lost one of its great battle leaders when Major General Maurice Rose, commanding the 3d Armored Division, was killed in action near Paderborn. General Rose had commanded his division since the Normandy breakthrough, and it was under his leadership that it had earned its nickname of the "Spearhead Division". The great work and brilliant success of the division reflected the ability and spirit of its leader. Because of the importance of the attack in which he was leading his division when he lost his life and to honor his personal courage in battle, VII Corps and First Army adopted the name of the "Rose Pocket" for the operation which isolated the Ruhr.

While the 3d Armored Division was driving north to close the pocket, the 104th was following closely in the eastern part of the Corps zone, and the 1st was moving more slowly against stiffer resistance farther west. Intelligence was received of a proposed enemy attack to break out of the rapidly closing Ruhr trap by a tank-and-infantry drive east in the vicinity of Winterburg. The attack to the north was therefore suspended for one of the regiments of the 104th Division, and it deployed to the northwest to counter the threat. With characteristic Timberwolf speed, our troops seized the enemy's line of departure before he could attack, and for the next four days beat back all enemy attempts to penetrate the VII Corps ring in that area.

An armored task force from the Spearhead Division made a firm junction with elements of the 2d Armored and 83d Infantry Divisions (XIX Corps) at Lippstadt on April 1st. The Ruhr trap was closed, a trap which isolated about 5,000 square miles of enemy territory, including some of the most highly developed industrial area in Europe. Completely encircled by American troops, over 350,000 enemy, units of German Army Group D, were cut off from supplies and reinforcements. This was one of the greatest operations of its kind in all history, and a heavy blow to the already hard-pressed German army and nation.

Major General Maurice Rose, 3d Armored Division, Killed in Action, 31 March 1945.

Thousands of prisoners continued to flow through our PW enclosures each day as all along the VII Corps left flank our units regrouped and continued their attacks to improve local positions. The 9th Infantry Division was attached to the Corps and joined in the ring around the Ruhr, and the 4th Cavalry and Brigadier General Clift Andrus' 1st Division moved farther north. On the day after the Rose Pocket was closed, the sector held by the 78th and 8th Divisions went to control of the XVIII Airborne Corps, and three days later most of the remainder of the Corps front on the pocket was taken over by the III Corps.

Part of one day's collection of prisoners.

Then while troops north and south of the remaining VII Corps front attacked to shrink the pocket and release the rest of our troops, the 3d Armored Division, now commanded by Brigadier General Doyle O. Hickey, launched a new drive to the east.

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